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Statement of Disclaimer 
This project report is a result of a class assignment; it has been graded and accepted as 
fulfillment of the course requirements. Acceptance of this report in fulfillment of the course 
requirements does not imply technical accuracy or reliability. Any use of information in this 
report is done at the risk of the user. These risks may include, but may not be limited to, 
catastrophic failure of the device or infringement of patent or copyright laws. California 
Polytechnic State University at San Luis Obispo and its staff cannot be held liable for any use or 
misuse of the project. 
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Executive Summary 
This document is the report of the culminating experience as part of the master’s program in 
fire protection engineering at the California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo. This 
report contains a life safety analysis of the fire protection systems of a chosen project building. 
The building examined is the Robert and Margrit Mondavi Center for the Performing Arts, 
located on the University of California Davis campus. The building was constructed in 2002 
where the first performance occurred in October 2002. 
A large portion of the report applies prescriptive code requirements to evaluate compliance 
with current codes and standards. The analysis involves the requirements for construction, 
structural fire protection, occupant egress, fire detection and alarm, and fire suppression.  
The final section of the report is a performance based analysis of two fire scenarios including 
the lobby atrium and the main theater stage locations. The Available Safe Egress Time (ASET) 
versus Required Safe Egress Time (RSET) model was used to evaluate the performance of the 
fire protection systems in each space. A tenability analysis was used to produce the ASET for 
occupants to escape the building. To evaluate tenability conditions in each space during a fire, 
Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) was used. To estimate the RSET, Pathfinder was used to estimate 
occupant egress times from the space. 
The performance based analysis provides recommendations to reduce the risk or consequences 
of a fire in each space. Recommendations for both spaces involve the removal of fuel sources 
from the space and should be considered a high risk if not removed without further analysis 
showing otherwise. The fuel source within the lobby was already planned before this report 
was created. 
Even though the author believes this report to be valid, it should be noted that this report was 
an academic exercise and consultation with a licensed professional engineer should occur 
before changes are made to the building. 
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Section 1. 
Building Introduction 
1.1 Building Overview 
The Robert and Margrit Mondavi Center for the Performing Arts is a performing arts building 
located on the University of California Davis campus in Davis, California. The building contains 
two performance spaces, the 1,801 seat Jackson Hall and the 250 seat Vanderhoef Studio 
Theatre. Other spaces including the Yocha Dehe Grand Lobby and the Bartholomew Room can 
be used for special events and meetings. 
 
1.2 Applicable Codes 
The following relevant codes were used for the original building design: 
1995 California Building Code 
1995 California Fire Code 
1993 NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm Code 
1992 NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems 
The following relevant codes were used to analyze the fire protection systems currently in the 
building: 
2010 California Building Code 
2010 California Fire Code 
2013 NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code 
2013 NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems 
All code references throughout the report are from the 2010 California Building Code unless 
otherwise specified. 
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Section 2. 
Code Analysis 
2.1 Building Occupancy Classification 
The building is a mixed occupancy. The entire building except for the Studio Theatre is classified 
as an Assembly Group A-1 occupancy. The Studio Theatre space is classified as an Assembly 
Group A-3 occupancy. 
The building contains Business and Storage accessory occupancies. 
2.2 Construction Classification 
Because the building is a mixed occupancy classification, the most stringent requirements must 
be used, which is based on the Assembly Occupancy, A-1. The building construction is Type IB 
because the building construction elements are of non-combustible materials and the applied 
structural fire protection is less than would be required for a Type IA building. 
2.3 Building Height and Area 
The building height and area were calculated in accordance with the California Building Code 
Table 503. The maximum allowable height is 160 feet and 5 stories plus 20 feet and 1 story for 
having an automatic sprinkler system. The building is 97.5 feet tall and 5 stories. The allowable 
floor area per story is unlimited. 
2.4 Structural Fire Protection 
Table 2.1 shows the required and applied fire protection of the building construction elements.  
Table 2.1 – Building elements construction fire protection requirements 
Building Element 
Required Fire-Resistance 
Rating (hour) 
Applied Fire-Resistance 
Rating (hour) 
Primary structural frame 2 2 
Bearing walls 
     Exterior 
     Interior 
 
2 
2 
 
4 
2 
Nonbearing walls/partitions 
     Exterior 
     Interior 
 
0 
0 
 
0,1 
0,1 
Floor construction 2 2 
Roof construction 1 1 
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A fire-resistance rating for the exterior walls is not required for walls with a fire separation 
distance greater than 30 feet away from the centerline of a public way or street, the closest 
interior lot line, or to an imaginary line between two buildings on the property. Figure 2.1 
shows the separation distances. Only the West side of the building does not meet the 30 feet 
requirement. The distance between the Mondavi Center and an imaginary line between the 
Mondavi Center and the next building is less than 30 feet but greater than 10 feet. This requires 
a fire-resistance rating of 1 hour for a Type IB building, unless it is a bearing wall, which is 
required to have a 2-hour fire-resistance rating. 
 
Figure 2.1 – Building exterior separation distances 
 
Separation Requirements 
The A-1 and A-3 occupancies are not required to be separated because they are both Assembly 
occupancies. Table 2.2 summarizes the separation requirements for incidental accessory 
occupancies. Table 2.3 summarizes the separation requirements for the building egress 
components. Table 2.4 summarizes the separation requirements for special situations unique to 
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certain building elements. Figure 2.2 shows the plan view of the 1st floor with existing 
separations. 
Table 2.2 – Separation requirements for incidental accessory occupancies 
Room/Area Req. Separation Applied Protection 
Fire Pump Room 2-hr; or 1 hr w/ fully sprinklered 
2-hr fire barrier and 
sprinklers 
Storage rooms >100 ft2 1-hr or auto fire-extinguishing system Sprinklers 
Furnace Room 1-hr or auto fire-extinguishing system Sprinklers 
 
Table 2.3 – Separation requirements for egress components 
Space Req. Separation Applied Protection 
Corridors 1-hr or 0-hr w/ Fully Sprinklered  1-hr fire partition 
Horiz./Vert. Exit Enclosures 2-hr fire barrier 2-hr fire barrier 
 
Table 2.4 – Separation requirements for special situations 
Space Req. Separation Applied Protection 
Atrium <-> Rest of building 1-hr fire barrier or Horiz. Exit 1-hr constr. 20 min. 
doors 
Proscenium wall 2-hr construction 2-hr fire barrier* 
Stage to adjacent spaces 2-hr fire barrier 2-hr fire barrier* 
Adjacent <-> adjacent 
spaces 
1-hr fire barrier 1-hr fire barrier 
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Figure 2.2 – 1st floor existing separations 
 
Most separation requirements are met or exceeded. Because the lobby space is an atrium 
space, the space is required to be separated from the rest of the building by a 1-hour fire 
barrier or a horizontal assembly. The design plans specify 1-hour rated wall construction with 
20-minute rated doors. To be a 1-hour fire barrier, the doors must be 45-minute rated doors. 
This does not comply with the current code. 
The proscenium wall, which is the wall that separates the stage from the audience hall seats in 
Jackson Hall, has a 2-hour fire-resistance rating except for the opening. The opening is allowed 
to be protected by a fire curtain that complies with NFPA 80, Standard for Fire Doors and Other 
Opening Protectives. The fire curtain that is in place is a 20-minute rated fire curtain. At the 
time of design, the California Building Code required a proscenium curtain that is 20-minute 
rated. These opening and wall requirements are only required when the stage is greater than 
50 feet in height. 
All spaces adjacent to the stage are required to be separated from the stage by a 2-hour fire 
barrier as well. Then, those spaces must be separated from each other by a 1-hour fire barrier. 
There is a storage area at the back of the stage that is not separated from the stage. The space 
is used to store the shell structure, which is 57 feet wide, 42 feet tall, and 27 feet deep. Per 
code, the space should be separated from the stage by a 2-hour fire barrier, however, this is not 
feasible due to the size of the structure to be stored. It is likely that the Authority Having 
Jurisdiction approved the request to not separate this space. Figure 2.2 shows the shell storage 
space to the back of the stage. The performance section of this report will analyze this space. 
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Section 3.  
Egress 
3.1 Occupancy Classification and Use 
The entire building is classified as an Assembly occupancy A-1 with the exception of the Studio 
Theatre having an Assembly occupancy of A-3. Occupancy separation of assembly occupancies 
is not required under the California Building Code. 
Other spaces incidental to the main occupancies include business and storage spaces. Appendix 
B shows the layout of the building with each space marked for its specific use. 
3.2 Occupant Load 
The occupant load for individual spaces and each floor can be seen in Table 3.2. The occupancy 
load factors used were taken from the California Building Code Table 1004.1.1 and can be seen 
in Table 3.1. The two theaters used a combination of load factors. The fixed seating areas used 
the number of fixed seats as the occupant load. The disabled seating areas used the 
concentrated assembly factor and the non-fixed booth seating used the unconcentrated 
assembly factor.  
The lobby occupant load was calculated using the most restrictive value of 5 square feet per 
person since it is used for events. The 1995 CBC requires a value of 7 square feet per person be 
used. The original design calculation either did not use the required 7 square feet per person 
value or did not use the correct area. With an area of 5,949 ft2, an occupant load of 850 is 
obtained, which is significantly higher than the value of 760 shown in the obtained plans. Using 
the current code, the load factor of 5 creates a much higher occupant load of 1,190 occupants 
just on the third floor.  
It should also be noted that the Jackson Hall and Lobby well never be simultaneously occupied. 
Therefore they should be considered independently for egress.  
The Jackson Hall fixed seating areas have an occupant load equal to the number of seats. For 
the non-fixed seating areas within the theater, the concentrated assembly load factor was. The 
amount of Jackson Hall seating can also be reduced to allow for more stage space or basement 
level orchestra space. The occupant load of this area was factored into the calculation of each 
space as if it was fully occupied for each space. 
A load factor for the fly gallery is not specified in the CBC, the value of 100 was taken from 
Table 7.3.1.2 of NFPA 101, Life Safety Code. 
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Table 3.1  
Function of Space Load Factor (ft2 per person) 
Assembly 
    Fixed Seats 
    Standing 
    Concentrated 
    Unconcentrated 
 
# of seats 
5 net 
7 net 
15 net 
Business Area 100 gross 
Accessory storage, mechanical 
equipment rooms 
300 gross 
Stages 15 net 
Fly  Gallery 100 net 
 
3.3 Exit Capacity 
Section 1005.1 of the CBC gives the requirements for egress widths. The total means of egress 
width shall not be less than the total occupant load served multiplied by 0.3 in. per occupant 
for stairs and 0.2 inches per occupant for other egress components. Also, the loss of one means 
of egress must not reduce the capacity to less than 50 percent of the required capacity. 
Table 3.2 shows the calculated occupant load and exit capacity of each space. Each individual 
exit capacity was calculated using its most limiting door or stair. Each space’s capacity was 
calculated by combining its individual exit capacities. The loss of any one exit does not reduce 
the capacity to less than 50 percent for any floor, but only the first floor has enough exit 
capacity to handle the occupants it serves. 
Table 3.2     
Location 
Floor Area 
(ft2) 
Load Factor (ft2 
per person) 
Load 
Limiting 
Door/Stair 
Exit Capacity 
Atrium Lobby 
     1st Floor 
     2nd  Floor 
     3rd Floor 
 
8,615 
2,435 
5,949 
5 
 
1,725 
900 
1190 
 
3,105 
560 
761 
Jackson Hall Seating 
     Orchestra/Parterre 
     First Balcony 
     Second Balcony 
 
580 
580 
300 
# seats, 7, 100 
 
1,179 
393 
364 
 
1309 
400 
400 
Studio Theatre 3,334 # seats, 7, 15 335 390 
Stage 9,500 15, 300, 100 498 675 
Back of House 
     1st Floor 
     2nd Floor 
 
6,000 
1,500 
7, 15, 100, 300 
 
718 
96 
 
756 
329 
Basement 2,700 7, 15, 100, 300 107 467 
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Section 1004.5 requires that means of egress that converge from above and below must have 
exits that can accommodate both floors. All four exits where this occurs easily meet the 
capacity requirement. The West exit doors accommodate occupants of the Basement and Back 
of House Second Floor. The load is easily met with a door discharge capacity of 300 occupants. 
Both North and South stair enclosures easily accommodate egress from the Basement and First 
Balcony. 
3.4 Arrangement of Means of Egress 
Exit Access 
Section 1015.2 gives the requirements for exit positioning. The exits must be placed so that 
their availability is made obvious and unobstructed at all times. The Mondavi Center has great 
visibility throughout the building, finding an exit would not be difficult should the need arise. 
Section 1015.2.1 requires that where two exits or exit access doorways are required, they must 
be placed an appropriate distance apart. Because the building is fully sprinklered, the distance 
may be reduced to one third of the diagonal distance of the entire building. Because the 
building corridors are protected by at least 1-hour fire resistance ratings, the distance between 
exits may be measured along the corridors. Each level meets this requirement. 
Section 1022.2 requires that the two exit enclosures terminate at an exit discharge or a public 
way. The North exit enclosure is actually in the middle of the building, but the enclosure travels 
to the basement level and opens outside to a stair leading to a public way. The South enclosure 
discharges directly to a public way. 
Section 1014.2.2.1 requires that basement space must have at least one exit access that leads 
directly to an exterior exit door opening directly to an exit discharge. Stair enclosure S6 meets 
this requirement by being enclosed with a 2 hour fire resistance rating and leading to the exit 
enclosure that leads directly to an exit discharge to a public way. 
In Appendix B, the floor plans are shown labeled with the floor exits, exit discharges, and exit 
enclosures on the floor plans. 
Travel Distance 
The exit access travel distance requirements are given in Section 1016. Table 1016.1 gives an 
exit access travel distance of 250 feet for assembly occupancies with a sprinkler system. This is 
measured from the most remote position of a story along a path of egress to the nearest exit. 
The Orchestra Terrace seating section exits to the atrium and requires special consideration to 
meet requirements. The egress path goes through the Lobby atrium from the second level to 
the main exit. The egress path can only travel 200 feet through an atrium and 250 feet total. 
This arrangement is still acceptable. 
The balcony lobby at the third floor of the atrium must also meet the 200 feet requirement 
down two flights of stairs to the main lobby exit discharge. 
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Because the stairways serving the West end of the building are not enclosed, the travel distance 
must be measured down the stairs and through the floor of exit discharge. The distance is still 
measured to be less than the required 250 feet. 
All other spaces meet the travel distance requirement of 250 feet. 
Common Paths of Travel 
Section 1028.8 requires that common paths of egress travel do not exceed 30 feet from any 
seat to where an occupant has two options of egress paths. This requirement is satisfied in the 
theater seating. 
Throughout the rest of the building, Section 1014.3 requires that common paths of egress 
travel cannot exceed 75 feet. 
Dead Ends 
Section 1018.4 gives the requirements for dead ends. Dead ends in corridors cannot exceed 20 
feet. There are no dead ends that come close to 20 feet within the building. Section 1028.9.5 
requires that dead end aisles cannot exceed 20 feet as well. None of the aisles exceed this 
requirement. 
Area of Refuge 
Areas of refuge are required for persons with disabilities by Section 1007 in order to egress 
from the upper levels of the Jackson Hall theater seating. The elevator lobbies in the atrium 
space act as the areas of refuge. Because the elevator lobbies are in an atrium, section 1007.6 
allows the elevator lobbies to be unenclosed, assuming the atrium space is formed by a smoke 
barrier. 
3.5 Fire Resistance Ratings of Egress Components 
Section 404.6 requires atriums to be separated from adjacent spaces by a 1-hour fire barrier. 
The Mondavi Center satisfies this requirement through all floors of the atrium lobby. 
There are two enclosed exit stairs in the building that connect the three floors of the Jackson 
Hall Theater seating and adjacent atrium space. Section 1.1.5.2 requires that exit enclosures 
connecting less than four stories have at least a 1 hour fire resistance rating. Both enclosures 
have a 2 hour fire resistance rating with 90-minute rated doors. 
The egress stairways on the West side of the building do not need to be enclosed because they 
only connect two floors together. The basement access stair in the West end of the building is 
enclosed from the First Floor, allowing the stair leading to the Second floor be open. 
All exit access corridors are protected with at least a 1 hour fire resistance rating. 
3.6 Interior Finish 
Section 1028.11 requires that sloped assembly aisle surfaces not exceeding one unit vertical in 
eight units horizontal consist of a ramp having a slip resistant walking surface. The Jackson Hall 
Theater orchestra seating contains this on the lower level. The aisles exceeding this slope are 
required to have risers and treads that extend across the full width of aisles. 
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3.7 Exit Signage 
Marking of Egress 
Section 1011.1 requires that assembly occupancies have approved exit signs marking every exit 
and exit access door in the building. If the path of egress to an exit is not readily visible, the 
direction of egress must be shown with an exit sign. At no point in an exit access corridor or exit 
passageway can there be more than 100 feet to the nearest visible exit sign. 
The main exterior exit doors are not required to have exit signs because it is obviously and 
clearly identifiable as exits. 
Floor-level exit signs and path marking is not required in this building because it is protected 
throughout by an approved supervised sprinkler system. Regardless, this building was still fitted 
with floor-level exit signs. 
Illumination of Egress 
Section 1006 gives the requirements for illumination of egress components. The means of 
egress must be illuminated at all times when the building is occupied.  The illumination level 
must be at least 1 foot-candle at the walking surface. For theaters, the illumination at the 
walking surface may be reduced to not less than 0.2 foot-candle during performances, as long 
as the fire alarm system restores illumination automatically. During loss of primary power, 
emergency power shall be provided in aisles and egress stairways in the theaters, in the 
corridors, exit enclosures, and exit passageways, exterior egress components and landings, and 
interior exit discharge elements. 
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Section 4. 
Fire Detection, Alarm, and Communication 
4.1 Code Requirements 
The California Building Code Section requires that the Mondavi Center must have a manual fire 
alarm system that activates the occupant notification system. There is an exception for 
buildings that are fully sprinklered and have waterflow initiation but it does not apply in this 
case because the building is used for educational purposes. Because there is an atrium 
connecting more than two stories, the CBC requires that a fire alarm system with smoke 
detection throughout the atrium must be installed. 
Regardless of the CBC requirements, the UC Davis Standards and Design Guide overrides these 
requirements and requires a full fire detection and alarm system per Section 28 31 00 Fire 
Detection and Alarm. 
The CBC also requires that system alarm activation must activate an emergency voice/alarm 
communication system because the occupant load is greater than 1,000 people and because 
there is an atrium connecting more than two stories. 
The building does contain detection and alarm through with an emergency voice/alarm 
communication system. 
4.2  System Operating Characteristics 
This project building uses a proprietary system. The fire alarm control panel (FACP) transmits a 
signal to the UC Davis Police Department Communications Center. The Communications Center 
will then notify the UC Davis Fire Department to respond. The system was initially installed with 
an auxiliary alarm system. The FACP was originally connected to a Gamewell street box (shunt 
type) that would be tripped during an alarm condition. However, UC Davis has removed these 
boxes throughout the campus, including this one. 
The FACP can receive signals from multiple types of addressable devices initiating an alarm, 
trouble, or supervisory signal. Through the build in DACT, it will then send out a signal through 
two telephone lines through the telecom room to notify the fire department. Notification 
devices, including emergency voice/alarm communication systems and visible notification 
systems, will also be activated to notify occupants.  
If a fire is detected in the main lobby or studio lobby (Fire alarm or sprinkler Zone 6), smoke 
control operations will activate. Smoke dampers will shut off system air supply to the upper 
lobby and open the main lobby doors. Two exhaust fans in the ceiling will turn on, venting 
smoke out of the atrium. 
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Fire Alarm Control Panel 
The IntelliKnight 5820XL Addressable Fire Alarm Control Panel (campus wide standard), 
manufactured by Silent Knight, is located in the Security Room 150, near rear building entrance. 
The UC Davis Standards and Design Guide Section 28 31 00, Fire Detection and Alarm, requires 
that all fire alarm system products must be manufactured by Silent Knight. The Fire Alarm 
Control Panel is accompanied by the following devices: 
 
1 Multi-circuit Voice Evacuation Panel 
• Wheelock, Model SC-SAPE-AA4SR 
• Located adjacent FACP 
4 Fire Alarm Annunciators 
• Silent Knight, Model 5860 
• Located throughout building near entrances 
1 Firefighter Control Panel 
• H.R. Kirkland 
• Located adjacent FACP 
2 Fire Alarm Power Supply 
• Silent Knight, Model 5895XL 
• Located in room 109 and room 303 
1 Smoke Control Panel 
• Notifier AFP-1010 
• Located in room 109 
 
4.3 Signal Disposition 
Alarm Signal 
The system goes into alarm when any smoke or heat detectors are triggered, a manual pull box 
is pulled, or a waterflow switch detects movement. Elevator lobby detectors also recall 
elevators. Heat detectors in the elevator equipment room will, after recalling the elevators, 
shunt power to them. Duct dampers will close according to their respective smoke detector. 
When an alarm signal is triggered, automatic visual and voice signals will be activated 
throughout the building. All magnetic door holders will also release. If detection is triggered in 
the main lobby or Studio Theatre lobby, lobby smoke removal sequence will be initiated. 
An alarm signal is annunciated on each Annunciator panel and then transmitted to the UCD 
Police Department Communications Center via two dedicated telephone lines through the 
communications room. 
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Supervisory Signal 
Supervisory signal shall occur if a tamper switches on the Fire Alarm Control Panel door, 
Emergency Voice/Alarm Communications system door, or Fire Alarm Power Supply door are 
triggered. Waterflow tamper switches on the sprinkler system will set off a supervisory signal as 
well. 
A supervisory signal is annunciated on each Annunciator panel and then transmitted to the UCD 
Police Department Communications Center via two dedicated telephone lines through the 
communications room. 
Trouble Signal 
Fire pump phase reversal, fire pump loss of AC power, and system equipment malfunction will 
cause a trouble signal. 
A trouble signal is annunciated on each Annunciator panel and then transmitted to the UCD 
Police Department Communications Center via two dedicated telephone through the 
communications room. 
 
4.4  Initiation 
Manual Fire Alarm Boxes 
Manual fire alarm boxes are required to be within 5 feet of each exit. Additional boxes must be 
installed so that there is no point within the building further than 200 ft away from a box. The 
handle must be between 42 and 48 inches above the finished floor. The box must be colored 
red. 
Smoke Detectors 
The campus standards require that detector location and spacing be determined by use of 
NFPA 72 Appendix A for irregular areas where smooth ceiling spacing does not exceed 30 feet 
per Section 28 31 00 [3.1 B.]. The corridor smoke detectors are designed in accordance with 
NFPA 72 Appendix A. Corridors that are 8 feet wide or less have detectors spaced at 40 feet, 
which is in accordance with NFPA 72 Appendix A for 30 foot spacing detectors. 
There are four rooms that do not contain spot type smoke detection: three dressing rooms and 
a mechanical room. The reason for this is unknown. In place of spot type detection, open air, 
photoelectric, duct smoke detectors may have been used. These are the only rooms that have 
these open air duct detectors in the return air ducts. The applicable standard, UL 268A, 
explicitly states that duct detectors are not intended for open area protection. It would not 
have been any issue to extend spot type detection into this space. It may be a good idea to 
extend detection into this space because dressing rooms can have significant fuel loads due to 
performance equipment and wardrobes. Figure 4.1 shows the locations of the three dressing 
rooms adjacent to the Studio Theatre and their open air duct detectors. 
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Figure 4.1 – Lobby atrium 2nd floor beam detector at 14 feet above the 
floor 
 
Heat Detectors 
Heat detectors are only used in elevator equipment rooms, used to shunt power to the 
elevator, and the boiler room. The heat detectors in the elevator equipment rooms are 
positioned in accordance with NFPA 72. Section 21.4.1 establishes the requirements that the 
heat detector used to shut down power before the sprinkler system activates must have a 
lower temperature rating and a higher sensitivity than the sprinkler. The detector used has a 
temperature rating of 135°F and a spacing of 70 feet where the sprinkler has a temperature 
rating of 155°F. 
Beam Detector 
A beam detector was installed in the lobby atrium 2nd floor bannister, as shown in Figure 4.2, 
to improve smoke detection in the lobby atrium. However, due to numerous nuisance alarms, 
the device has been taken out of service. The detector has initiated an alarm condition several 
times in situations such as when a coat was placed over the banister blocking the beam and 
when a service worker placed a ladder in the beam path. The beam detector should not 
activate an alarm signal in these situations because the System Sensor data sheet for the device 
specifies that a measured obscuration value above 95% will produce a trouble signal. The beam 
detector is not necessary for stratification because the atrium air handling system does not 
allow heat buildup at the ceiling because it circulates air through the ceiling. 
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Figure 4.2 – Lobby atrium 2nd floor beam detector at 14 feet above the floor  
 
Because the diameter of a smoke plume expands at a rate of approximately 0.4 times the 
height, the beam detector spacing at 14 feet should be no more than 6 feet. There is only one 
beam detector in this space that is over 30 feet wide. Therefore, there should be at least 5 
beam detectors to adequately cover this space. 
Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) was used to simulate smoke detection in this space by beam 
detection and spot type detection. When the fire was approximately 9 feet away from the edge 
of the beam, the beam detector never saw an obscuration value above 10%. According to the 
device data sheet, a value of 30% (± 5%) is required to activate. Therefore, the beam detector 
does not activate. 
When the beam was placed directly over the fire, the beam detector saw 30% obscuration and 
activated at approximately 37 seconds. However, the spot type detector at the ceiling at 40 feet 
detected the fire in 26 seconds. 
These observations make it clear that the beam detector is not efficient or necessary for this 
space. 
Initiating Device List 
28 Manual Fire Alarm boxes 
• Simplex 2099-9754 Manual Pull Station 
• Module: Silent Knight SD500-MIM 
• Mounted 48” Above finished floor to center of device 
• Location: 
o Next to all exit doors 
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o In basement, next to exit stairs leading to first floor 
161 Photoelectric Smoke Detectors w/ Low Profile Detector Base 
• Silent Knight SD505-APS Photoelectric Smoke Detector 
• Silent Knight SD505-6AB Low Profile Detector Base 
• Ceiling Mounted 
• Location: 
o All rooms including bathrooms, storage rooms, elevator mechanical room 
o Corridors spaced at a 40 ft maximum 
o Not in mechanical, fire pump, telecom or boiler rooms 
o Not in Jackson Hall audience chamber or Studio Theatre 
o Not in dressing rooms 160, 159 and 158 
o Not in certain rooms that already have a Photoelectric smoke detector 
with detector relay that cover the room sufficiently 
37 Photoelectric Smoke Detectors w/ Relay Detector Base 
• Silent Knight SD505-APS Photoelectric Smoke Detector 
• Silent Knight SD505-6RB Relay Detector Base 
• Ceiling/Wall mounted above doorway or elevator doorway 
• Ceiling mounted in Boiler room 
• Location 
o Outside elevator 
o Elevator recall activation 
o Elevator fire curtain activation 
o Outside  all Fire Doors 
o Door holder/release 
o Set & Crate Room 
o roll up door release 
o Boiler Room 
4 Heat Detectors w/ Low Profile Detector Base 
• Silent Knight SD505-AHS Fixed Temperature Heat Detector 
• Silent Knight SD505-6AB Low Profile Detector Base 
• Shunt Trip Elevator Power 
• Ceiling mounted 
• Location 
o Boiler Room 
o Elevator Equipment Rooms 
o Elevator Shunt Power 
o Near fire sprinkler head  
1 Beam Detector 
• System Sensor 6424 Projected Beam Smoke Detector 
• Wall mounted 
• Location: 
o Atrium Second Level banister 
19 Duct Detectors 
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• Silent Knight SD505-AIS Ionization Smoke Detector 
• Silent Knight Duct Detector Housing 
• Mounted on side of air duct 
4 Open Air Smoke Detectors 
• System Sensor 2151 Duct Smoke Detector 
• Photoelectric Smoke Detector 
• System Sensor B114LP Detector Base 
• Pendent mounted inside return air duct 
• Location: 
o Return air ducts for Dressing Rooms 160, 159 and 158 
o Basement return air duct for Basement Level Boiler Room  
8 Waterflow Switch Monitors 
• Waterflow Switch FBO 
• Module: Silent Knight SD500-AIM 
• Location: 
o Basement main sprinkler line 
o Orchestra level sprinkler risers 
8 Tamper Switch Monitors 
• Tamper Switch FBO 
• Module: Silent Knight SD500-AIM 
• Location: 
o All control valves 
o Double check valve assembly 
o Orchestra level sprinkler risers 
22 Duct Detector Remote Test Switches 
• Silent Knight SD505-DTS Duct Detector Remote Test Switch 
• Mounted 72” above finished floor to center of device 
• Location: 
o At each duct smoke detector 
4 Open Air Detector Remote Test Switches 
• System Sensor RTS-451 Remote Test Station 
• Mounted 72” above finished floor to center of device 
• Location: 
o At each open air duct detector smoke detector 
6 Fire Curtain Fusible Link 
• FBO 
• Fixed Temperature, 165° F 
• Location: 
o Spaced along curtain cable 
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2 Fire Line Release Pull Ring 
• FBO 
• Manual operation 
• Location: 
o Upstage of the proscenium wall on either side of the opening 
4.5  Notification 
Visible Notification 
The visible characteristics of this system comply with NFPA 72 Section 18.5. Wall mounted 
strobe devices are mounted 80 to 96 inches above the finished floor in accordance with 
18.5.4.1. Rooms containing strobes are designed in accordance with 18.5.4.3. 
Strobe devices in corridors are installed with at least a 15 candela rating. However, several 
corridor ends do not have strobe devices located within 15 feet of the end. This is a code 
violation of NFPA 72 Section 18.5.4.4.5. These situations also are not in compliance with 
18.5.4.3. Each situation could easily be fixed by having placed one strobe device closer to the 
corridor end in question. 
In one specific location, shown in Figure 4.3, a strobe notification device is blocked by a roll 
down security door. In the figure, the security door is shown in the normal up position, but 
even rolled up, the egress door on the right still blocks the strobe from reaching the office 
space to the left. There are no other strobes that reach this area. 
 
Figure 4.3 – Wall mounted strobe blocked by security gate  
 
Audible Notification 
The Emergency Voice/Alarm Communications system was designed in accordance with the UCD 
Standards and Design Guide. Speakers shall be installed so that speakers use ½ watt setting 
unless otherwise specified on the drawings [2.10 F. 2.]. The drawings show no other watt 
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settings to be used. The standards and design guide also states that bathroom speakers shall be 
set to the lower setting of ¼ watt because alarm threshold may be high [2.10 E. 6.]. Therefore, 
¼ watt speakers should be indicated on the drawings. Either the speakers are set to ½ watt or 
the bathroom requirement was not established or enforced when the alarm system was 
designed in 1992. Either way, it will be easy to check and fix by looking at the individual 
speaker. Decreasing the watt setting will only decrease the load on the amplifiers. 
Considering all speakers are powered at ½ watt, the decibel rating for the speakers and 
speaker/strobes is 84.4 dBA at 10 feet. The furthest distance between any two speakers is in 
audience chamber in Jackson Hall at 80 feet. Using NFPA 72 Table A.18.4.3 we can find the 
average ambient sound of places of assembly to be 55 dBA. Using the 6 foot rule of thumb we 
can estimate the dBA output of the speakers in the center of the hall to be 72.1 dBA. Per 
18.4.3.5.1, the sound level must be 15 dB above ambient. Therefore, the sound system must 
achieve a sound level of 70 dBA or higher. The building meets this requirement throughout. 
Another consideration in the audience chamber is a loud performance may be in progress when 
an alarm condition occurs. The maximum sound level will likely be much higher than 55 dBA. To 
accommodate for this, the FACP has the capability to shut down all performance system 
speakers and change lighting conditions to assist alerting occupants. Strobe lighting will also be 
effective in notifying occupants. 
Notification Appliance List 
8 Speaker/Strobes 
• Wheelock ET70-24MCW Speaker/Strobe 
• Wall Mounted 80" above finished floor to bottom of device 
• Location: 
o Basement: Electrical room, telecom room, boiler room, mechanical room, 
corridor outside mechanical room, trap room 
149 Strobes 
• Wheelock RSS-24MCW and RSS-241575 Strobes 
• Wall Mounted 80" above finished floor to bottom of device 
• Location: 
o All corridors, dressing rooms, green room, certain storage rooms, 
concessions rooms, bathrooms, main stage, Jackson Hall and Studio 
Theatre 
201 Ceiling Mounted Speakers 
• Wheelock ET90-R 
• Ceiling Mounted 
• Location: 
o All corridors, Jackson Hall, Studio Theatre, bathrooms, green room, 
dressing rooms, select other rooms 
12 Wall Mounted Speakers 
• Wheelock ET70-R 
• Wall Mounted 80" above finished floor to bottom of device 
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• Location: 
o Orchestra pit, main stage, shell and riser storage 
1 Sprinkler Alarm Exterior Bell 
• FBO 
• Wall Mounted 10' above finished grade 
• Location: 
o Outside on the west/rear side of the building facing fire department 
connection 
4.6  Power Requirements 
Requirements 
The requirements for secondary power are established by the UC Davis Standards and Design 
Guide and NFPA 72 Section 10.5.6. UC Davis requires that backup battery systems shall be 
provided with the capability of a 24 hour standby period followed by 5 minutes of alarm [2.4 
F.1.h.]. However, NFPA 72 requires that a system utilizing a emergency voice system will be 
capable of 24 hours of standby followed by 15 minutes of alarm [10.5.6.3.1(2)]. 
Assumptions 
Signaling line circuit M02 has been assumed to be one circuit attached to Room 303 Fire Alarm 
Power Supply #2. Looking at the riser diagram or the plan drawings, it is impossible to see what 
lines are connected to which Fire Alarm Power Supply. The worst case scenario has been 
chosen to connect the circuit to only one of the two devices. FAPS#2 was chosen because it has 
a SLC Expander module attached to it. It is also assumed that FAPS#2 was intended to carry at 
least part of the M02 circuit. 
Battery Calculations 
The battery calculation spread sheets can be found in Appendix F and the voltage drop 
calculations can be found in Appendix G. 
Calculations were performed on the current fire alarm and backup system. Three separate 
rooms on different floors contain a control panel with backup batteries. Battery capacity 
requirements were calculated for each room. The room with the main FACP also contains the 
voice evacuation panel. Fire Alarm Power Supply #1 is located next to the Smoke Control Panel. 
The secondary power of these two devices is from the same set of batteries, so their individual 
requirements are consolidated. FAPS #2 is located remotely. 
Calculations show that the FACP and EVAC system will only use 64% of the battery’s rated 
capacity. However, the UC Davis Standards and Design guide requires that the batteries must 
not exceed 80% of its rated capacity and also must contain 25% reserve capacity for future 
expansion. The current batteries do not provide quite enough capacity to support these 
requirements. 26.08 Amp-Hours of capacity are required where 26 Amp-Hours are provided. 
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Battery information for the equipment in room 109 and 303 was not acquired. To find the 
minimum battery capacity to meet the requirements, the minimum required capacities are 
multiplied by 1.25 again. This is to account for the requirement where the current draw cannot 
exceed 80% of the battery rated capacity. Looking again at Table 4.1, a minimum capacity 
battery for the FAPS#1 and the SCP shall provide at least 5.66 Amp-Hours. For FAPS#2 batteries 
with a minimum capacity 10.88 Amp-Hours shall be provided. Two 12V 6AH and two 12V 12AH 
batteries will be sufficient. 
Table 4.1 Battery Calculation Summary     
 
Required 
Standby 
Capacity 
(Amp-Hours) 
Required 
Alarm 
Capacity 
(Amp-Hours) 
Total 
Required 
Capacity 
(Amp-Hour) 
Adjusted 
Required 
Capacity 
(Amp-Hour) 
Actual Battery 
Rated 
Capacity 
(Amp-Hour) 
Security Room 150 
FACP and EVACS 
13.46 3.23 16.69 26.08 26.00 
Janitor Room 109 
FAPS#1 and SCP 
2.16 1.46 3.62 5.66 Unknown 
Storage Room 303 
FAPS#2 
4.67 2.29 6.96 10.88 Unknown 
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Section 5.  
Fire Suppression 
5.1  System Design 
The Mondavi Center is protected throughout by a fully supervised wet-pipe system automatic 
sprinkler system as required by the California Building Code Section 903.2.1.1. Because the 
building is larger than 52,000 ft2, it must be separated into zones protected by separate risers. 
The building is separated into six zones, each with a separate riser. Table 5.1 shows the 
separate zones and their locations. Figure 5.1 shows the floor plan with each zone’s location. 
Table 5.1  
Zone Location 
1 Basement 
2 Back of House 
3 Stage 
4 Jackson Hall Audience Chamber 
5 Studio Theatre 
6 Atrium/Lobby 
 
Figure 5.1 – Sprinkler zones 
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Design Basis 
The building contains three different occupancy classifications. The basement, Zone #1, has an 
occupancy classification of ordinary hazard (Group 1), the stage, Zone #3, has an occupancy 
classification of ordinary hazard (Group 2), and the rest of the building is light hazard. The 
loading dock is ordinary hazard (Group 2) and because of this, 15 feet inside Zone #2 must be 
designed for the same ordinary hazard (Group 2). 
Ordinary hazard zones #1 and #3 are separated from the light hazard areas by two hour fire 
resistance rating construction with 90 minute fire doors, which allows the adjacent zones to be 
considered separate in the hydraulic calculations. 
The total building hose stream allowance required for hydraulic calculations is 250 gpm. The 
building is fully supervised by the UCD Dispatch Center, therefore the required water supply 
duration is the lower 60 minutes. 
The density area method was used to calculate the hydraulic sprinkler demands. Table 5.2 
shows the design criteria for each zone. 
Table 5.2    
Zone 
Occupancy 
Classification 
Design Density 
(gpm/ft2) 
Area 
(ft2) 
1 OH (GRP 1) 0.15 1500 
3 OH (GRP 2) 0.20 1500 
2,4,5,6 Light Hazard 0.10 1500 
 
5.2  Water Supply 
Existing Water Supply 
The water is supplied by a 12 inch UC Davis campus controlled water line. An 8 inch water line 
connects the 12 inch water line to the fire pump in the basement pump room. This 8 inch line 
supplies the sprinkler system and the standpipe system. The following campus water supply 
data was given by the UCD Fire Department for this building: 
Static Pressure: 65 psi 
Residual Pressure: 20 psi 
Flow: 16,825 gpm 
 
Fire Pump and Jockey Pump 
The installed fire pump is a 6x6x9.5 Vertical In-Line Pump, type 1580, manufactured by A-C Fire 
Pump Systems. The following data was found from the information plate on the pump: 
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Flow: 65 psi 
Head: 20 psi 
Speed: 16,825 gpm 
Impellor Diameter: 7.75 in. 
Net Pressure at 150% Capacity: 61 psi 
Max. Net Pressure Developed: 97 psi 
Maximum B.H.P.: 54.5 
 
The installed jockey pump is a Grundfos type CR2-60.  It maintains the system pressure against 
minor system pressure losses. The following data was found from the information plate on the 
pump: 
Flow: 11 gpm 
Head: 220 ft 
Speed: 3,450 rpm 
 
Combined Water Supply 
The UC Davis water supply and fire pump data were combined for the sprinkler system design 
analysis. Figure 5.2 shows the combined supply curve at the base of the risers. Pressure losses 
were considered due to the distance and elevation difference from the pump location in the 
basement to the risers on the first floor. The losses were calculated with an assumed 750 gpm 
flow. 
 
Figure 5.2 – Water supply curve  
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5.3  System Components 
The 8” ductile iron supply line connected to the UC Davis water main has a double check valve 
assembly with two supervised OS&Y gate valves. The 8” supply pipe enters the building through 
the basement on the north side of the building and into the pump room. 
Existing Water Supply 
The pump room is located in the basement of the building. The following tables show the 
components installed in the pump room. 
Table 5.3: Pump Section    
Device Manufacturer Model 
Nom. 
Fitting Size 
OS&Y Gate Valve AVK 45-200-11 8” 
Eccentric Reducer Victaulic 51-C 8” to 6” 
Fire Pump 
A-C Fire Pump 
Systems 
6x6x9.5F type 
1580 
6” 
Eccentric Reducer Victaulic 51-C 6” to 8” 
Pressure Relief Valve    
Check Valve Victaulic  8” 
Supervised Butterfly Valve   8” 
 
Table 5.4: Venturi Loop    
Device Manufacturer Model 
Nom. 
Fitting Size 
Throttle Valve   8” 
Venturi Meter Gerand  8” 
 
Table 5.5: By-pass Loop    
Device Manufacturer Model 
Nom. 
Fitting Size 
Supervised Butterfly Valve Victaulic  8” 
Check Valve Victaulic  8” 
Supervised Butterfly Valve Victaulic  8" 
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Table 5.6: Jockey Pump Loop    
Device Manufacturer Model 
Nom. 
Fitting Size 
Supervised OS&Y Gate 
Valve 
  2” 
Check Valve   2” 
Jockey Pump Grundfos CR2-60 2” 
Pressure Relief Valve   2” 
Supervised OS&Y Gate 
Valve 
  2” 
 
Table 5.7: Jockey Pump Loop    
Device Manufacturer Model 
Nom. 
Fitting Size 
Butterfly Valve with 
Tamper Switch 
Victaulic  3” 
Waterflow Switch System Sensor WFD30-2 3” 
Pressure Gauge   3” 
Test and Drain Valve   2” 
 
27 
 
Sprinklers 
Table 5.8 shows all of the sprinklers and their specifications installed in the building. 
Table 5.8: Sprinklers       
Manufacturer Model 
Thread 
Size 
Orifice 
Size 
K-Factor 
(gpm/psi1/2) 
Temp. 
Rating   
(° F) 
Type Amount 
Viking Horizon-Mirage 1/2" 1/2” 5.5 155 Conc. SSP 18 
Viking Horizon-Mirage 1/2" 1/2" 5.5 165 Conc. SSP 109 
Gem A 17/32” 3/4" 8.1 165 E.C. HSW 14 
Central ELO LH 3/4" 0.64” 11.4 155 E.C. SSP 30 
Viking Micromatic “M” 1/2" 1/2" 5.5 155 HSW 11 
Viking Microfast “M” 1/2" 1/2" 5.5 200 QRHSW 5 
Viking Microfast “M” 1/2" 1/2" 5.5 155 QRHSW 4 
Viking Microfast “M” 1/2" 1/2" 5.5 155 Rec. QRSSP 208 
Viking Microfast “M” 1/2" 1/2" 5.5 155 Rec. SSP 318 
Viking Micromatic “M” 1/2" 1/2" 5.5 155 Rec. SSP 14 
Viking Micromatic “M” 1/2" 1/2" 5.5 155 SSP 64 
Viking Micromatic “M” 1/2" 1/2" 5.5 155 SSP 50 
Viking Micromatic “M” 1/2" 1/2" 5.5 155 SSU 226 
 
Riser Assembly 
The riser assembly is located on the ground level, in the north corridor in the back of house 
zone. There are 6 riser assemblies that each contain the components shown in Table 5.9. All 
risers are equipped with a combination inspectors test and drain that drains into an exterior 
storm water drain. 
Table 5.9: Riser Assembly    
Device Manufacturer Model 
Nom. 
Fitting Size 
Butterfly Valve with 
Tamper Switch 
Victaulic  3” 
Waterflow Switch System Sensor WFD30-2 3” 
Pressure Gauge   3” 
Test and Drain Valve   2” 
 
Fire Department Connections 
The building has three separate fire department connections. One is on the East side at the 
front of the building, one is on the South side by the street, and the last one is at the rear West 
side parking lot. The East side and South side connections have four 2½” connections each 
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where the rear one has two 2½” connections. Originally the West side connection was not 
installed for the Mondavi Center. The decision was made to connect it to the Mondavi Center 
due to its proximity to the building. The pipe to the connections are 6” in diameter and 
connects to the system between the supply control valves and system control valves. 
5.4 Hydraulic Calculations 
Computer based hydraulic calculations were performed to determine the maximum system 
demand. The complexity of this building’s system made it impractical to perform by hand. 
AutoSPRINK VR10 was used to perform the calculations. 
Method Used 
The Audience Chamber, Zone #4, ended up being the most hydraulically demanding. It was not 
the obvious choice. The design area for the stage, Zone #3, is at a higher elevation, a higher 
occupancy hazard, and contains more sprinklers in the design area, but still did not come close 
to the Zone #4 demand. 
The design area sprinklers are the Central ELO LH extended coverage standard suppression 
pendent sprinklers. The maximum spacing that is allowed by its listing is 20 ft by 20 ft. All the 
sprinkler coverage areas are 400 ft2 because the furthest sprinkler is spaced that way. NFPA 13, 
11.2.3.2.2.3 requires that the minimum design area must be the area protected by 5 sprinklers 
or the design area corresponding to the hazard, whichever is greater. 5 sprinklers protect an 
area of 2000 ft2, which is greater than the 1500 ft2 design area for light hazard. 
 
Figure 5.3 – Design area 
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Not all of the sprinklers are evenly spaced at 20 ft apart. None of the sprinklers in the design 
area utilize their entire 400 ft2 capacity. This causes 5 sprinklers to only provide 1230 ft2. In 
order to reach the required 2000 ft2, a total of 9 extended coverage sprinklers had to be 
included in the design area. The minimum total flow required for 9 extended coverage 
sprinklers totals to 360 gpm.  The green area in Figure 5.3 shows the final design area compared 
with the original design area. The entire sprinkler system run back to the risers is shown in 
Appendix H. 
Results 
Using the AutoSPRINK VR computer software, the total water demand becomes 406 gpm at 
132.2 psi at the base of the riser. Including the hose stream brings the total water demand to 
656 gpm at 132.2 psi at the base of the riser. 
The UC Davis Standards and Design guide requires that a 10% safety factor must be added to 
either the pressure or the flow rate. Increasing the pressure by the safety factor increases the 
supply dangerously close to the maximum supply. Increasing the water flow by the 10% safety 
factor still keeps the required water supply safely under the supply curve. The total demand 
curve and water supply curve are shown in Figure 5.4. The original design curve is also shown in 
green. 
 
Figure 5.4 – Water supply and demand curve 
 
Analysis 
This design does comply with NFPA 13. However, the design could be improved considerably. 
This design area had a significantly higher demand than the rest of the system. The system 
could have been easily modified to improve the demand. Using smaller design area sprinklers 
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and spacing them more evenly could decrease the demand significantly by reducing the design 
area and flow requirements per individual sprinkler. 
The original design calculated a much lower demand at 528 gpm at 107 psi at the base of the 
riser. However, the plans show only 6 sprinklers in a design area of 1500 ft2. The difference in 
design method may be due to the original design using the 1994 edition of NFPA 13. 
If the original design is correct, the pump is oversized for this application. At 528 gpm, the 
available pressure is approximately 150 psi. This gives a buffer of 40%. The high pressures may 
cause problems with the small K value of 5.5 most of the sprinklers have. High pressures can 
distort the discharge pattern of low K value sprinklers. NFPA 13 Section 8.3.4 requires sprinklers 
have at least a K value of 5.6 unless otherwise permitted. However, this requirement is not in 
the 1997 edition of NFPA, therefore it is doubtful that it is in the 1994 edition. 
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Section 6.  
Performance Based Analysis 
6.1 Method 
The performance based analysis of this project uses the Available Safe Egress Time (ASET) 
versus Required Safe Egress Time (RSET) method. The ASET is the estimated available time 
when the egress paths are considered safe for egress. A tenability analysis was performed to 
estimate the time until safe egress is not possible. The tenability of the space is estimated using 
the computational fluid dynamics model, Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) version 6.1, developed 
by the National Institute for Standards and Technology. The tenability factors include the 
carbon monoxide concentration, air temperature, visibility distance, and heat flux from the fire. 
The RSET is the estimated time it takes for occupants to exit the space. The RSET comprises the 
detection, alarm, pre-movement, and movement times. The detection time is estimated using 
FDS to estimate the time it takes for a smoke detector to activate. The alarm and pre-
movement time were estimated based on suggested values from a British Standard on 
occupant movement, PD-7974-6:2004. The movement time was estimated using the computer 
model PATHFINDER version 2014, developed by Thunderhead Engineering. 
Two fire scenarios were used. One involves a fire in the lobby atrium space on the east side of 
the space. The other involves a fire in the storage space at the back of the Jackson Hall stage. 
6.2 Tenability Criteria 
Visibility 
The visibility criterion was selected based on research performed by Sherfig and 
Hadjisophocleous. A value of 10 meters is suggested. 
Toxic Gas Exposure 
According to Purser, carbon monoxide is the most important toxic product from a fire to cause 
incapacitation. To calculate the concentration for incapacitation, the Stewart equation  is 
suggested: 
 
   = 3.317 × 10.()()/ 
 
 Where 
 [CO] = Carbon monoxide concentration (ppm v/v 20°C) 
 V = Volume of air breathed each minute (L) 
 t = Exposure time (minutes) 
 D = Exposure dose (percent COHb) for incapacitation 
32 
 
A suggested default case assuming the occupants are in a state of “light work” gives input 
values for V = 25 and D = 30. Using a fractional dose of 1.0 to reach incapacitation, a carbon 
monoxide concentration of 950 ppm is calculated over a 30 minute exposure time. 
Exposure to Heat 
Exposure to heat from fire can cause incapacitation and death from heat stroke, body surface 
burns, and respiratory tract burns. Purser suggests that conditions are maintained below a 
temperature of 60°C. 
Radiant Heat 
The radiant heat flux maximum limit was taken to be 2.5 kW/m2 as is suggested by Babrauskus 
in the SFPE Handbook. 
6.3 Lobby Fire Scenario 
6.3.1 Scenario Overview 
The first design fire scenario is located within the 
lobby atrium space. The space has a fully automatic 
sprinkler system and full smoke detection. 
Immediately after detection of smoke, the 
emergency voice alarm/communication system 
activates throughout the building, commencing 
egress. The atrium has a mechanical smoke 
management system that also activates with 
smoke detection or sprinkler water flow. In this 
case, because the building has full smoke 
detection, smoke detection activates the smoke 
control system. 
The smoke control system comprises two 77,000 cfm exhaust fans, seven make-up air doors, 
and mechanical make-up air vents. The exhaust fans are located above the 4th floor doors 
leading to the Jackson Hall seating. The make-up air doors are the main lobby and Studio 
Theatre entrance doors. The mechanical make-up air floor vents are located around the 
perimeter of the 1st floor of the main lobby, as shown in green in Figure 6.1. There is also one 
mechanical make-up air floor vent on the 2nd floor balcony area directly adjacent to the 
Bartholomew Room in the oval shaped building. The West side of the elevator structure has a 
mechanical make-up air vent on the 1st floor and 3rd floor. When the smoke control system 
activates, the following operations sequence occurs: 
1. Lobby and bathroom air handling units shut down. 
2. Make-up air doors open. 
3. Fire smoke dampers close to the 2nd floor supply air vents, except for the balcony vent 
adjacent to the Bartholomew Room. 
4. Lobby return air handling unit dampers switch to outside air configuration. 
5. Return air handling unit and smoke exhaust fans turn on. 
Figure 6.1 – Lobby Atrium 
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6.3.2 Design Fire 
The space does not contain many combustible objects most of the time. During performances 
however, they do have a small coat check area with two coat racks. They also sometimes allow 
for the storage of backpacks for students, since they are not allowed to be brought into the 
theater. This creates an unpredictable fire hazard because the contents of every backpack 
would be unknown. The design fire is based on a fire that is initiated within the coat check area, 
spreading to both coat racks.  
Figure 6.2 shows the floor plan of the Northern half of the 1st Floor of the lobby. The fire is 
shown against the glass wall on the North end of the lobby, adjacent to the oval shaped 
building. The blue line shows the edge of the floor above. The fire is mostly under this balcony 
and has a sprinkler and a smoke detector directly above the fire. Smoke detection is used to 
initiate the smoke control sequence, which was estimated to be 21 seconds by the FDS model. 
 
 
Figure 6.2 – Northern half of the lobby atrium  
 
The red ring is the area where heat flux from the fire is greater than the 2.5 kW criteria for 
untenable conditions. This figure shows that the exit door and stairway within the ring are 
within an untenable area and was not used for the egress time estimation. The following 
calculation, Equation 6.1, shows how the untenable radius of 18 feet around the fire was 
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calculated using the point source radiation model. A safety factor of 2 was used as suggested in 
the SFPE Handbook. 
 =   4"# ,%" = 
'800 *+,(0.3)4"'2.5 *+//0, 
 = 2.8 / = 9 2 
34 = 9 2 × 2 = 18 2 
Equation 6.1 
 
The fuel load of dozens of backpacks and two coat racks is difficult to predict. However, 
because the coat check area is directly under a sprinkler, it is assumed that the sprinkler 
controls the fire. The heat release rate is ramped up, using a fast growth rate t2 profile, until 
sprinkler activation. The heat release rate at sprinkler activation was estimated using two 
methods, the DETACT model, based on Alpert correlations, and Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) 
model developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).  
 
Figure 6.3 – DETACT and FDS sprinkler temperature estimation 
 
Figure 6.3 shows the heat release rate versus time with estimated sprinkler temperatures, as 
was estimated by the DETACT and FDS models. The DETACT model estimated sprinkler 
activation at about 120 seconds. FDS showed a longer activation time of 130 seconds. This is 
likely due to FDS taking into account the effects of air flow due to the smoke control system 
activating at only 21 seconds into the simulation. The more conservative value of 130 seconds 
was used to limit the fire size to 800 kW. 
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6.3.3 Concerns 
The main concern is that the smoke management system needs to be capable of exhausting 
enough smoke in order to maintain tenable conditions for the duration of egress. 
The other concern involves the balcony directly 
above the fire, which is the only egress path for one 
space. The lobby has the potential to hold a large 
number of occupants. Queuing will likely occur in 
the space. One particular spot contains an allowed 
load of 49 occupants with only one door, which 
then egresses through the atrium space, directly 
above the fire on the 2nd floor. This is an assembly 
space called the Bartholomew Room. Because it is 
the only escape route, it is very important to 
maintain tenable conditions on this balcony. Figure 
6.4 shows the plan view of the second floor lobby 
and Bartholomew Room and the fire design fire location. 
The beam detector in the lobby is also a concern because it has been taken out of service due 
to nuisance alarms. It should be verified that adequate smoke detection can still be achieved 
without it. The beam detector is discussed in the Fire Detection, Alarm, and Communication 
section 5.3 of this report. 
6.4 Lobby Fire Results 
6.4.1 Available Safe Egress Time (ASET) 
As shown in Figure 6.5 below, Carbon Monoxide concentrations stay well under the 1,000 PPM 
criteria during the entire FDS simulation and was maintained constant by the smoke exhaust 
system. 
 
Figure 6.5 – Fire Dynamics Simulator Estimated Carbon Monoxide Concentration at 
600 Seconds 
Figure 6.4 – Plan view of lobby 2nd floor 
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As shown in Figure 6.6 below, temperature levels do approach the tenability criteria of 60° C, 
however, they are still within the limit. 
 
 
Figure 6.6 – Fire Dynamics Simulator Estimated Temperature at 600 Seconds 
 
As shown in Figure 6.7 below, visibility levels on the 1st and 4th floors stay within the tenable 
limits. However, the 2nd and 3rd floors lose tenability at the balconies just above the fire. 
 
 
Figure 6.7 – Fire Dynamics Simulator Estimated Visibility Distance at 600 Seconds 
 
As shown in Figure 6.8 below, the 10 meter visibility distance is lost at about 225 seconds on 
both levels, resulting in an available egress time of 225 seconds for those spaces. This is the 
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balcony that serves as the egress path for the Bartholomew Room occupants. 
 
 
Figure 6.8 – Fire Dynamics Simulator Estimated Visibility Distance at 225 Seconds 
 
6.4.2 Required Safe Egress Time (RSET) 
The detection time was estimated by simulating a smoke detector in Fire Dynamics Simulator. 
Because the smoke detector is directly above the fire at about 9 feet above the floor, the 
detector responds very quickly at approximately 21 seconds. 
The alarm time was estimated using the British Standard, PD-7974-6:2004. The document 
suggests using a time that is the time it takes for the emergency voice message to be spoken 
twice. This was estimated to be 20 seconds. 
Pre-movement time was estimated in accordance with the British Standard, PD-7974-6:2004. 
The building has a full Emergency Voice/Alarm Communications system with a pre-recorded 
message, which activates immediately after detection. The occupants will be awake but were 
not considered familiar with their surroundings. During any event, the assembly occupied staff 
contains staff, trained to evacuate the building. Because of these assumptions, the 1st 
percentile pre-movement with a Management Level M2 classification was used. The 1 minute 
pre-movement time used is sufficiently conservative considering these circumstances. 
The movement time was estimated using PATHFINDER. The lobby was not loaded using the 
calculated occupant load calculated in the Egress Analysis section of this report. The value 
calculated there is not a reasonable value to use for a performance based design. Judging by 
conversations with building management, the highest load the lobby sees is during 
performances in Jackson Hall. The space is used for events, but all planned events are capped at 
200 to 250 occupants, significantly less than the code required calculated load of almost 4,000. 
During performances, however, even though it is very unlikely, the lobby could see the all of the 
theater’s 1,801 occupants in the lobby. Therefore, 1,801 occupants was used because that is 
the actual limited capacity of the theater. The occupants were evenly spaced throughout the 
lobby. 
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In reality, all of the theater occupants do not stay in the lobby at once. After a performance, 
many occupants leave the building soon after the show. During intermissions, many guests stay 
in the theater instead of move into the lobby where other exits are used during emergencies. 
Considering this, using the 1,801 occupant load is sufficiently conservative. 
PATHFINDER estimated the time for occupants to move past the untenable space, shown in 
Figure 6.8, to be 39 seconds. Figure 6.9 shows the PATHFINDER results at 39 seconds. 
 
Figure 6.9 – PATHFINDER simulation results at 39 seconds  
 
A safety factor of 1.5 was used in accordance with California Building Code section 909.4.6, 
which states that smoke control systems be operational for 20 minutes or 1.5 times the 
calculated egress time, whichever is less. 
Table 6.1 – Lobby atrium required safe egress time (RSET) 
Scenario 
Detection 
Time (s) 
Alarm 
Time 
(s) 
Pre-
movement 
Time (s) 
Movement 
Time (s) 
CBC 
Factor 
Total 
RSET (s) 
Lobby Atrium Fire 
2nd Floor Egg 
3rd Floor Egg 
Elev. Lobbies 
Entire Lobby 
 
21 
 
20 
 
60 
 
39 
39 ∞ 
440 
 
1.5 
 
392 
257 ∞ 
812 
 
6.4.3 ASET vs. RSET 
Table 6.2 shows the summarized comparison of the calculated ASET and RSET values. It can be 
seen that all of the Lobby Atrium locations maintain tenable conditions. The 2nd floor and 3rd 
floor balconies, however, only meet the requirements by 15 seconds. 
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Table 6.2 – Lobby atrium ASET vs. RSET Summary 
Scenario 
Detection 
Time (s) 
Alarm 
Time 
(s) 
Pre-
movement 
Time (s) 
Movement 
Time (s) 
CBC 
Factor 
Total 
RSET 
(s) 
Total 
ASET 
(s) 
Lobby Atrium Fire 
2nd Floor Balc 
3rd Floor Balc 
Elev. Lobbies 
Entire Lobby 
21 20 60 
 
39 
39 ∞ 
440 
1.5 
 
210 
210 ∞ 
812 
 
225 
225 ∞ ∞ 
 
6.4.4 Recommendations 
The lobby meets the tenability criteria, but only just barely. It is recommended that the coat 
check area be moved out from under the balcony. Another FDS simulation was run to estimate 
conditions when the fuel is moved to the center of the lobby. Surprisingly, even though the fire 
was allowed to increase to 2 MW as could be seen by two full coat racks, tenable conditions 
were shown throughout the atrium. Therefore, an easy way to reduce risk would be to move 
the coat check area there. 
However, a better way would be to have a permanent coat check area within its own enclosed 
room. During the development of this cumulative experience project, it was discovered that 
plans are already in motion to add a dedicated coat check room within the Egg structure. This 
would likely significantly improve the conditions during a fire due to significantly limiting the 
amount of oxygen available for the fuel. Also, if the door used has an automatic door release, as 
does the rest of the building’s doors, the likelihood of untenable conditions in the lobby, 
resulting from a fire in the closed room, is even more unlikely. 
6.5 Stage Fire Scenario 
6.5.1 Scenario Overview 
The second design fire scenario is 
located within the Jackson Hall stage 
storage area, which is shown on the 
right side of Figure 6.10. At the 
opposite end of the seating there is a 
60 foot wide by 30 foot deep and 45 
foot tall storage space called the shell 
riser storage space. The storage area 
is completely open to the stage area. 
Even though all storage areas 
appurtenant to the stage are 
required to be separated from the 
stage by a 2 hour fire barrier, this 
space cannot be separated because of the shell structure that is stored in this space.  
Figure 6.10 – Jackson Hall Stage and Shell Riser Storage 
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The stage can be used in several different configurations, as shown in Figure 6.11. The 
configuration shown to the top right of Figure 6.11 shows the shell structure enclosing the 
proscenium opening improve accoustic sound coming from the stage. When the shell structure 
is not in use, the back side of the shell is removed and folded together, while the sides and top 
stay in one piece. The entire structure is then raised by air canisters and physically pushed to 
into the shell riser storage space. Because the shell riser structure is solid, it completely shields 
all sprinklers above the storage space from applying water to anything stored underneith. 
Therefore, it is assumed that the fire will not be sprinkler controlled as it was in the lobby fire 
scenario. 
 
Figure 6.11 – Jackson Hall stage configurations  
 
The stage only has smoke detection above doors that automatically close on detection. When 
these detectors activate, they also activate the emergency voice alarm/communication system. 
The highest smoke detector in the space is approximately 25 feet above the stage floor above a 
roll down door. FDS estimated smoke detection occurring at 160 seconds. The stage ceiling 
contains six heat activated vents. The proscenium opening to the theater seating is protected 
by a 20 minute rated fire curtain, which is lowered to cover the opening by manual activation 
and heat activated fusible links. It is assumed that the curtain is not manually activated. None 
of the sprinklers, heat vents, or fire curtain fusible links activated during the FDS simulation. 
6.5.2 Design Fire 
The storage space contains miscellaneous storage in addition to the shell structure, which can 
change depending on the performances. Looking at a picture of the storage space, Figure 6.12, 
a rack of insulated theater electrical audio and power cables can be seen circled in red. This 
presents a very high fuel load because the cables are hanging from the rack with plenty of air 
between them. This could cause a very well ventilated fire situation to occur. The design fire 
used assumes that this rack of cables ignites and fire spreads to the entire rack. The calculated 
maximum heat release rate is then maintained at a constant value because the fire could easily 
spread to adjacent fuels. 
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Figure 6.12 – Jackson Hall stage configurations  
 
The heat release rate ramps up at a conservative t2 rate until the maximum calculated heat 
release rate. The maximum heat release rate was calculated using a correlation provided by 
Lee. The correlation is based on cable tray fire data obtained by Tewarson et al. and Sumitra. 
The following calculation using this correlation shows the maximum heat release rate is 4 MW. 
#678 = 0.45#698" : 
#678 = 0.45 ;589 *+/0 < '15 /0, 
= = 4000 *+ 
Equation 6.2 
 
Figure 6.13 shows the location on the storage space and the design fire fuel. The red ring is the 
area where heat flux from the fire is greater than the 2.5 kW criteria for untenable conditions. 
This figure shows that the exit door on the north side of the stage is within the untenable 
region. Therefore, this door will not be used in the egress time calculation. The following 
calculation shows how the untenable radius of 40 feet around the fire was calculated using the 
point source radiation model. A safety factor of 2 was used as suggested in the SFPE Handbook. 
 =   4"# ,%" = 
'4000 *+,(0.3)4"'2.5 *+//0, 
 = 6.2 / = 20 2 
34 = 20 2 × 2 = 40 2 
Equation 6.3 
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Figure 6.13 – Plan view of the Jackson Hall stage and storage area  
 
6.5.3 Concerns 
The main concern of a fire in this space is that a very high heat release rate, long duration, fire 
could occur in a high value space with a high occupant load. There is effectively no suppression 
systems available to the space. The shell structure completely shields any fire from water. 
Smoke detection could also be delayed for a long time. During a performance, the stage may be 
kept dark. Because the storage space could be even darker, hidden behind curtain, human 
detection cannot be relied upon. Because there are no smoke detectors in that space or at the 
stage ceiling, it could take a long time before the stage ceiling space fills enough to activate the 
highest detector. By this time, the heat release rate of the fire can be very high. 
The delayed detection time not only delays occupant egress, but it also delays fire fighter 
response. By the time fire fighters arrive, the fire could already be too large and visibility levels 
may be too low for manual suppression. 
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6.6 Stage Fire Results 
6.6.1 Available Safe Egress Time (ASET) 
As shown in Figure 6.14 below, Carbon Monoxide concentrations stay well under the 1,000 
PPM criteria for at least the 600 second duration that the simulation was run. 
 
Figure 6.14 – Fire Dynamics Simulator Estimated Carbon Monoxide 
Concentration at 600 Seconds 
 
As shown in Figure 6.15 below, temperature levels do approach the tenability criteria of 60° C, 
however, they are still within the limit. 
 
Figure 6.15 – Fire Dynamics Simulator Estimated Temperature at 600 Seconds 
 
As shown in Figure 6.16 below, visibility levels at both the stage and the seating lose visibility 
tenability. The theater seating begins to lose tenability at around 415 seconds and completely 
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loses it at about 445 seconds. The stage begins to lose tenability at 750 seconds and then at 800 
seconds it is completely lost. 
 
Figure 6.16 – Fire Dynamics Simulator Estimated Visibility Distance at 600 Seconds 
 
6.6.2 Required Safe Egress Time (RSET) 
The detection time was estimated by simulating a smoke detector using Fire Dynamics 
Simulator. There was a significant delay to the detection of smoke because the only smoke 
detector is about 25 feet above the stage floor when the stage ceiling is at 87 feet high. The 
stage ceiling space must fill before it can reach the detector. Because the proscenium wall 
height is also higher than the smoke detector at about 40 feet, the smoke layer descends 
slower once it spills into the theater, further delaying smoke detection. FDS estimated this 
detection time to be about 160 seconds. 
Human detection cannot be relied upon in most situations. A fire in this space, even though 
there are over 2,000 occupants in the space, human detection is even more unreliable because 
of how dark a theater can get. Especially at the back of the stage where all the walls are painted 
black and the space is only used for storage, the space can be very dark. 
The alarm time was estimated using the British Standard, PD-7974-6:2004. The document 
suggests using a time that is the time it takes for the emergency voice message to be spoken 
twice. This was estimated to be 20 seconds. 
Pre-movement time was estimated in accordance with the British Standard, PD-7974-6:2004. 
Because the scenario is an assembly occupancy, it is expected that the occupants will be awake 
with a focal point at the stage. The building also has a full Emergency Voice/Alarm 
Communications system with a pre-recorded message where the system removes power from 
the performance audio systems, turns on the lights, and activates the alarm signal immediately 
after detection. For this design fire, automatic detection occurs when the fire has already 
produces a large amount of smoke.  The FDS simulation also shows smoke spilling into the 
seating hall at the detection time. During any event, the assembly occupied staff contains staff, 
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trained to evacuate the building. Because of these assumptions, the 1st percentile pre-
movement with a Management Level M2 classification was used. The 1 minute pre-movement 
time should be considered significantly conservative considering the circumstances. 
The movement time was estimated with PATHFINDER, shown in Figure 6.17. The red spaces are 
the 2 hour rated exits. The movement time was taken as the time it took for all occupants in the 
theater to move into the exit enclosure. Tenable conditions were required to be shown at the 
worst case location, which is the 2nd Floor Balcony. This method was chosen because, even 
though PATHFINDER shows the occupants on the 2nd Floor Balcony enter the stairs before the 
Orchestra seating occupants, the opposite could occur because many occupants from all levels 
use the same single exit door. Queuing at the bottom of the exit enclosure stairs occurs when 
occupants from different floors merge. It cannot be proved that the occupants on the above 
floors will be allowed to move to the discharge door first. Therefore PATHFINDER was used to 
estimate the time when the last occupant enters the exit enclosure. This time was estimated to 
be 404 seconds. 
 
Figure 6.17 – PATHFINDER model of the Jackson Hall seating  
 
A safety factor of 1.5 was used in accordance with California Building Code section 909.4.6, 
which states that smoke control systems be operational for 20 minutes or 1.5 times the 
calculated egress time, whichever is less. 
Table 6.3       
Scenario 
Detection 
Time (s) 
Alarm 
Time (s) 
Pre-movement 
Time (s) 
Movement 
Time (s) 
CBC 
Factor 
Total 
RSET (s) 
Stage Storage Fire 
2nd Balcony 
Stage 
 
160 
 
20 
 
60 
 
404 
234 
 
1.5 
 
966 
711 
 
6.6.3 ASET vs. RSET 
Table 6.4 shows the summarized comparison of the calculated ASET and RSET values. In the 
stage storage fire scenario, the required safe egress time is barely under the available. The 
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theater seating doesn’t even come close to passing. The required safe egress time is over twice 
the available. 
Table 6.4        
Scenario 
Detection 
Time (s) 
Alarm 
Time 
(s) 
Pre-
movement 
Time (s) 
Movement 
Time (s) 
CBC 
Factor 
Total 
RSET 
(s) 
Total 
ASET 
(s) 
Stage Storage Fire 
Stage 
Theater Seats 
 
160 
 
20 
 
60 
 
234 
404 
 
1.5 
 
711 
966 
 
750 
415 
 
6.6.4 Recommendations 
Clearly the stage fire is a large concern with a risk of very high consequences. Not only is the 
loss of life a large concern, but the monetary cost of such a fire could be extremely large. The 
damage to the campus image could also be very big. 
Three recommendations are made for this case. The first is to add more smoke detection to the 
stage ceiling. Because the storage area ceiling is blocked by the shell structure, smoke detection 
at that area is not as effective. Adding smoke detectors at the ceiling of the stage showed a 
reduction in smoke detection by about 50%, from 160 seconds to 77 seconds. 
The next recommendation is to optimize the egress of occupants from the theater seating. 
Because the staff is trained to evacuate occupants already, PATHFINDER can be used to predict 
the best evacuation routes out of the seating areas. A travel time reduction of 25% was 
achieved with this method. Also allowing occupants to egress through the Lobby decreased the 
evacuation time an additional 30%. This is allowed per code because the only limitation is the 
250 foot travel distance to an exit with 200 feet allowed through the atrium space. A total 
travel time reduction of about 48%, from 404 seconds to 210 seconds, was achieved. 
Combining the smoke detection and egress optimization methods, the RSET was reduced by 
about 43%, from 966 seconds to 550 seconds. This is quite a dramatic improvement. However, 
due to the fire size, it is still not enough 
Therefore, the final recommendation is to move the combustible material out of the storage 
space. 
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Appendix A – Jackson Hall Seating 
Figure A.1 – Orchestra/Orchestra Terrace 
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Figure A.2 – Grand Tier/ First Balcony 
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Figure A.3 – Upper Tier/Second Balcony Seating 
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Appendix B – Floor Plans of Space Use and Exit Locations 
Figure B.1 – Basement 
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Figure B.2 – Orchestra – First floor 
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Figure B.3 – Upper Orchestra Seating/2nd Floor Lobby 
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Figure B.4 – 1st Balcony/3rd Floor Lobby/2nd Floor Back of House 
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Figure B.5 – 2nd Balcony/4th Floor Lobby 
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Appendix C – Exit Capacity Calculations 
Table C.1 – Exit Capacity Calculation Spreadsheet 
Basement Floor 
Clear Width 
(in) Count Factor Capacity 
S. Stair S5 44 1 0.3 147 
W. Stair S8 52 1 0.3 173 
N. Stair S6 44 1 0.3 147 
Total Floor Exit Capacity    467 
     
1st Floor     
Main exit doors 89 7 0.2 3105 
Atrium side exit 31 1 0.2 155 
S. Exit Stair (S3) Doors 37 3 0.2 562 
OR S. Exit Stair (S4) 60 1 0.3 200 
N. Exit Stair (S4) Doors 37 2 0.2 375 
OR N. Exit Stair (S4) 60 1 0.3 200 
W. Green Room Exit 60 1 0.2 300 
SW Corridor Exit 31 1 0.2 157 
W. Corridor Exit 60 1 0.2 300 
NW. Corridor Exit 60 1 0.2 300 
N. Studio Theater Exit 60 1 0.2 300 
Total Floor Exit Capacity    5016 
     
Parterre Level     
N. Terrace Stair 60 1 0.3 200 
Atrium Stair (S1, S2) 84 2 0.3 560 
Total Floor Exit Capacity    760 
     
First balcony/Second 
Floor     
Atrium Balcony Stair (S1, 
S2) 84 2 0.3 560 
SW. Atrium Balcony Stair 
(S10) 60 1 0.3 200 
S. Exit Stair (S3) Door 35 2 0.2 353 
S. Exit Stair (S3) Door 41 1 0.2 203 
OR S. Exit Stair (S3) 60 1 0.3 200 
N. Exit Stair (S4) Door 35 2 0.2 353 
OR N. Exit Stair (S4) 60 1 0.3 200 
SW. Stair (S7) 55 1 0.3 183 
W. Stair (S8) 52 1 0.3 173 
Total Floor Exit Capacity    1517 
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Second Balcony     
S. Exit Stair (S3) Door 35 2 0.2 353 
OR. S. Exit Stair (S3) 60 1 0.3 200 
N. Exit Stair (S3) Door 35 2 0.2 353 
OR. N. Exit Stair (S3) 60 1 0.3 200 
Total Floor Exit Capacity    400 
     
Vertical Exit Discharge     
South Exit Stair (S3) 
Discharge 79 1 0.2 395 
N. Exit Stair (S4) Discharge 113 1 0.3 377 
     
     
Orchestra Level  - Jackson 
Hall     
S. Exit Door 37.45 2 0.2 375 
S. Discharge Door 79 1 0.2 395 
N. Exit Door 37.45 2 0.2 375 
N. Exit Stairs 113 1 0.3 377 
East Door 60 2 0.2 600 
Total Exit Capacity    1349 
     
First Balcony - Jackson 
Hall      
N. and S. Exit Door 35.3 4 0.2 706 
N. and S. Exit Stair 60 2 0.3 400 
Total Exit Capacity    400 
     
Second Balcony - Jackson 
Hall      
N. and S. Exit Door 35.3 4 0.2 706 
N. and S. Exit Stair 60 2 0.3 400 
Total Exit Capacity    400 
     
Stage - Jackson Hall     
W. Exit Door 67.5 2 0.2 675 
Total Exit Capacity    675 
     
Studio Theater     
Exit Door 39 2 0.2 390 
Total Exit Capacity    390 
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Appendix D – Pathfinder 
Figure D.1 – Model Overview 
 
Figure D.2 – Orchestra Level 
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Figure D.3 – First Balcony Level 
 
 
Figure D.4 – Second Balcony Level 
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Appendix E – Hydraulic Model Hand Calculations 
N. Exit Enclosure 
lower orchestra exit – 139 Occupants 
Assume already queued at t = 0 
25’ Aisle 
Fs = Fsm = 24 
Fc = (24)(3.5) 
Fc = 84 persons/min 
Figure 3-13.811 => D = 0.13 
S = 275 – 2.86(275)(0.13) = 173 ft/min 
t = 25/173 = 0.1445 min 
Stair  
6.5 ft long, 7,11 
Fs(stair) = 84/3.333 
Fs(stair) = 25.2 > Fsm = 18.5 
Figure 3-13.8 => D = 0.11 
S = 212 – 2.86(212)(0.11) = 145.3 
 t = 6.5/145.7 = 0.0447 min 
Fc = (18.5)(3.333) 
Fc = 61.667 
Assume 8ft Wide Corridor till exit – 23 ft long 
Fs(corr) = 61.667/(8-1.5) = 9.487 < Fsm 
Figure 3-13.8 => D = 0.025 
S = 255.7 > Sm = 235 
 t = 23/235 = 0.0979 min 
Time to reach convergence point 
t = 0.1445 + 0.0447 + 0.0979 
t = 0.2871 min 
  
                                                      
1 Chapter 3-13: “Employing the Hydraulic Model in Assessing Emergency Movement”, SFPE Handbook, 4th Edition 
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N. Exit Enclosure 
Upper Orchestra Exit – 138 Occupants 
Assume already queued at t = 0 
56’ long 6’ cross aisle 
Fs = Fsm        We(cross) = 6 – 1 = 5 
Fsm = 24 
Fc = (24)(3.5) = 84 people/min 
84 = Fs(cross) (5) 
Fs(cross) = 16.8 
Figure 3-13.8 => D = 0.075 
S = 216 ft/min 
 t = 56/216 = 0.2593 min 
Exit Door 
Fs(door) = 84/2.12 = 39.62 > Fsm = 24 
Fc = (24)(2.12) = 50.88 people/min 
Corridor 
Fs(corr) = 50.88/(6.1605 – 1.5) = 10.9 < Fsm 
Figure 3-13.8 => D = 0.045 
S = 239.67 > Sm = 235 
 t = 25/235 = 0.1064 min 
Total time to converging stair 
t = 0.3657 min 
Second Balcony 
Assume queue at t = 0 
4ft wide stair -> 5.85 ft wide corridor 32.2 ft long 
Fs = Fsm = 21.2 
Fc = (21.2)(4-0.5) = 74.2 people/min 
Fs(corr) = 74.2/(5.85-1.5) 
Fs(corr) = 17.06 < Fsm 
Figure 3-13.8 => D = 0.075 
S = 275 – 2.86(275)(0.075) = 216 
 t = 32.2/216 = 0.1491 min 
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Exit Door 
Fs(door) = 74.2/1.94 = 38.25 > Fsm = 24 
Fc = (24)(1.94) = 46.56 people/min 
Corridor 
29ft x 5ft 
Fs(corr) = 46.56/(5-1.5) 
Fs(corr) = 13.30 < Fsm 
Figure 3-13.8 => D = 0.05 
S = 275 – 286(275)(0.05) = 235.7 > 235 
 t = 29/235 = 0.1234 min 
Stair 
33.25 ft x 5 ft 7,11 
Fs(stair) = 46.56/(5-1) = 11.64 < Fsm 
Figure 3-13.8 => D = 0.06 
S = 212 + 2.86(212)(0.06) = 175.6 ft/min 
 t = 33.3/175.6 = 0.1896 min 
First Balcony Landing 
Fs(corr) = 46.56/(5-1.5) = 13.30 
D = 0.05 
S = 235 
 t = 8/235 = 0.03404 min 
Second Balcony Occupant Time to First Balcony Convergence 
 t = 0.4961 min 
First Balcony – 171 Occupants 
Same as Second Balcony to stair of convergence 
Fc = 74.2 people/min 
Fs(corr) = 17.06 
 t = 0.1491 min 
Exit Door 
Fsm = 24 
Fc = (24)(1.94) = 4656 people/min 
Amount of First Balcony Occupants in stair when Second Balcony Occupants converge 
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= (46.56)(0.4961 – 0.1491) 
= (46.56)(0.347) 
= 16 people => leaves 155 Occupants to queue 
Fc = 46.56 + 46.56 = 93.12 
Stairs 
36 ft x 5 ft 7,11 
Fs = 93.12/(5-1) = 23.287 > Fsm = 18.5 
Figure 3-13.8 => D = 0.175 
S = 212 – 2.86(212)(0.175) = 105.9 
 t = 36/105.9 = 0.3399 min 
Corridor  
33 ft x 5 ft 
Fc = (18.5)(5-1) = 74 
Fs(corr) = 74/(5-1.5) = 21.14 
Figure 3-13.8 => D = 0.08 
S = 275 – 2.86(275)(0.08) = 212 
 t = 33/212 = 0.1557 
Time convergence point is reached by all levels 
 t = 0.4961 + 0.3399 + 0.1557 
 t = 0.9917 min 
When does queuing happen? 
Stair limiting factor 
Fc = 50.88 + 61.667 + 46.56 = 159.107 
Fs = 159.107/(10-1) = 17.7 < Fsm = 18.5        queuing does not happen yet 
Fc = 159.107 + 46.56 = 205.7 
Fs = 205.7/(10-1) = 22.86 > Fsm = 18.5 
Queuing occurs when occupants of 1st/2nd Balconies Reach 
10’ stair convergence point at time 0.9917 min. 
Occupants Ahead of Convergence point at t = 0.9917 min 
Lower Orchestra Exit 
0.3657 – 0.2871 = 0.0786   Time occupants pass through 10’ stair before convergence 
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Fs(stair) = 61.667/(10-1) = 6.85 < Fsm 
 => Fc = 61.667 
 # of occupants = (61667)(0.0786) = 4.847 leaving 134.153 left 
All Orchestra 
0.9917 – 0.3657 = 0.626 min 
Fc = 50.88 + 61.667 = 112.547 
 # of occupants = (112.547)(0.626) = 70.45 occupants leaving 201.703 occupants from 
Orchestra 
At 0.9917 min, all floor occupants converge at the top of the 10 stair and queuing occurs. 
Stair 
10 ft x 20 ft 
Fc = 50.88 + 61.667 + 45.56 + 45.56 
Fc = 203.667 
Fs = 203.667/(10-1) = 22.63 > Fsm = 18.5 
Fc = (18.5)(10-1) = 166.5 
Figure 3-13.8 => D = 0.175 
S = 212 – 2.86(212)(0.175) = 105.9 ft/min 
 t = 20/105.9 = 0.1889 min 
Corridor 
30 ft x 10 ft 
Fs = 166.5/(10-1.5) = 19.6 < Fsm 
Figure 3-13.8 => D = 0.1 
S = 275 – 2.86(275)(0.1) = 196.4 
 t = 30/196.4 = 0.1527 min 
Doorway 
74.2 inches 
Fs = 166.5/(6.183-1) = 32.1 > Fsm = 24 
Fc = (24)(6.183-1) = 124.4 
Door Landing 
7 ft x 10 ft 
Fs = 124.4/(10-1.5) = 14.64 < Fsm 
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Figure 3-13.8 => D = 0.065 
S = 275 – 2.86(275)(0.065) = 223.9 ft/min 
 t = 7/223.9 = 0.0313 min 
Outside Stair 
20 ft x 10 ft 7,11 
Fs = 124.4/(10-1) = 13.78 < Fsm 
Figure 3-13.8 => D = 0.075 
S = 212 – 2.86(212)(0.075) = 166.5 ft/min 
 t = 20/166.5 = 0.1201 min 
Total Jackson Hall Evacuation Time 
= 0.9917 + 0.1889 + 0.1527 + 0.0313 + 0.1201 
  + (348 + 134.153 + 201.703)/(124.4 people/min) 
= 1.4847 +  5.4972 
= 7 minutes 
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Appendix F – Battery Calculation Excel Sheets 
Table F.1 – Main Fire Alarm Control Panel Current Calculations 
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Table F.2 – Fire Alarm Power Supply #1 Current Calculations 
 
 
Table F.3 – Smoke Control Panel Current Calculation 
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Table F.4 – Fire Alarm Power Supply #2 Current Calculations 
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Table F.5 – Number of different candela settings on each circuit 
 
 
Table F.6 – Emergency Voice/Alarm Communications Panel Current Calculation 
 
 
Table F.7 – Required Standby and Alarm Capacity Calculations 
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Appendix G – Voltage Drop Calculation 
 
Lumped Method is use for worst scenario with factor of safety added on to the 
length of the circuit due to estimated wire lengths. 
 
NEC CH. 9 Table 8: 12 AWG Stranded Uncoated Copper Wire: 
 R  = 1.98 ohm/kFT 
Total Length of single circuit with factor of safety: 
 Factor of safety used because length is estimated. 
 2 * L =  2 * 594 = 1188 + 15% * 1188 = 1366.2 ft 
Current Draw from Horn Strobe and Sync Module cut sheet: 
 15/75: 0.09 A * 2 = 0.18 A 
 15 cd: 0.06 A * 11 = 0.66 A 
 30 cd: 0.092 A * 1 = 0.092 A 
 75 cd: 0.165 A * 0 = 0 
 110 cd: 0.22 A * 3 = 0.66 A 
  
 Total: 1.592 A 
Minimum Supplied Voltage: 
 Vterm  = 24V – 24V * 15% = 20.4 
Minimum Device Voltage:  
 Operating Voltage Range with MDL3 Module: 16V – 33V 
 Vload = 16V 
Voltage Drop Calculation: 
 VD = 2 * L * R * I / 1000 
 VD = 1366.2 * 1.98 * 1.592 / 1000  
 VD = 4.31 
 %VD = (VD / 24) * 100 
 %VD = (4.31 / 24) * 100 
 %VD = 18.0% 
Vterm – VD must be more than 16V. 
20.4 – 4.31 = 16.09V 
VD is greater than 16V. Circuit complies with NFPA 72  
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Appendix H – Fire Sprinkler Remote Area 
Figure H.1 – Orchestra Level 
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Figure H.2 – Parterre Level 
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Figure H.3 – 1st Floor Balcony 
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Figure H.4 – 2nd Floor Balcony 
 
